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WAS HE GUILTY AS CHARGED? AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE 
BASED ON THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM 12 ANGRY 
MEN 
NEIL VIDMAR, SARA SUN BEALE, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, & JAMES E. 
COLEMAN, JR.*
In 12 Angry Men a young Hispanic man was charged with killing his 
father and put on trial for his life. After stormy deliberations, the jury found 
him not guilty. The theme of the film is that Juror #8 prevented a miscar-
riage of justice by his stubborn persistence in adhering to the almost reli-
gious belief that a criminal defendant should be accorded the benefit of 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and his nagging insistence on closely 
examining all of the evidence. The important message is that one person 
can make a difference. The message is, of course, to be applauded. The 
burden of proof in a criminal trial and the importance of each individual 
juror form the cornerstone of the American jury system. 
But the story, as so often happens, is more complicated than that sim-
ple message suggests. A careful review of the evidence and the jury’s 
analysis of the evidence suggest that the twelve angry men may have pro-
duced an injustice: specifically, they may have acquitted a guilty man. A 
jury is instructed to consider all of the relevant trial evidence and the impli-
cations of that evidence, but that was not done during the deliberations. 
Viewed from this perspective, the message of 12 Angry Men can be seen as 
very different than the conventional interpretation as a vindication of inno-
cence. Through the leadership of Juror #8 the other jurors confronted their 
ethnic and personal prejudices as they deconstructed the evidence favoring 
the prosecution. Yet, we contend, in their deconstruction efforts the jurors 
failed to consider an alternative story favoring guilt, a story that focuses on 
circumstantial evidence. 
There may be a larger lesson from looking at the movie in this way. 
Legal rules for criminal trials are intentionally slanted toward giving the 
benefit of doubt to the defendant, and we should hope that the rules have 
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even more sway when the defendant is charged with murder (although 
often they do not). Nevertheless, despite legitimate concerns about convict-
ing innocent persons, society has an equally strong interest in ensuring that 
guilty persons are convicted. 
In the body of this essay we build the case for a story favoring guilt. 
We then leave the fictionalized story to consider a real-life case whose 
factual elements show a striking parallel to those of the movie and involve 
an alleged false acquittal based on the jury’s failure to consider the circum-
stantial evidence. Finally, we contrast that case with another case resulting 
in a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Our essay poses 
important questions bearing on how jurors use direct and circumstantial 
evidence. 
I. THE “STORY MODEL” OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 
Criminal trials involve a dispute about an historical event: either the 
defendant did it or he didn’t.1 As Bennett and Feldman have pointed out, 
the dispute is about competing narratives.2 Under Anglo-American adver-
sary procedure, the prosecution produces evidence consistent with a story 
pointing to guilt. In turn, the defense lawyer attempts to show that the 
prosecution’s story is flawed and incomplete or inconsistent with alterna-
tive evidence suggesting that the defendant is not guilty. The jurors’ task is 
to evaluate these competing narratives and decide which side’s version is 
correct by applying their experience and inferential abilities to the trial 
evidence. 
Building upon this insight, Pennington and Hastie proposed that jurors 
impose a narrative story structure on the trial evidence using three types of 
knowledge.3 First, they draw upon case specific information learned at 
trial, that is, testimony from witnesses about the contested past events. Sec-
ond, the jurors reason from this information by analogizing it to their per-
sonal knowledge about events that are similar in content to the issues in 
 1. Sometimes, of course, the dispute involves whether a crime actually occurred and other times 
the trial involves the degree of culpability or whether culpability should be assessed at all, as in cases 
involving insanity defenses. However, to simplify matters for this essay we consider only cases of 
identity of an offender. 
 2. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM (1981) (providing a fuller description of competing story development in the adversary 
system). 
 3. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story 
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 522 (1991). The story model and narrative reasoning by jurors is 
discussed in more detail in NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT 
ACCIDENTS 41–86 (2000), and in NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE 
VERDICT, at ch. 6 (2007). 
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dispute. These events might include similar crimes of which jurors are 
aware or similar situations. Finally, the jurors incorporate generic expecta-
tions about what makes a complete story, for instance, that human actions 
are usually driven by goal-directed motives. In a set of experiments in 
which certain facts had been omitted, Pennington and Hastie found that 
jurors filled in the gaps by speculating about facts external to the trial in 
order to develop a complete narrative. In additional experiments those au-
thors examined the effects of variations in the order in which the facts were 
presented. They found that more coherent orders of evidence tended to 
correlate with the ability to persuade jurors toward a specific verdict.4
Combining their various findings, the authors developed what they 
called the “story model” of juror decision making. The decision-making 
process consists of three stages: developing stories (or “narratives”) from 
the trial evidence; considering the verdict alternatives from the legal in-
structions provided by the judge (such as guilty versus not guilty)5; and, 
finally, matching the various stories to these verdict categories. The verdict 
is derived from the best fit between narrative and verdict category.6
The law expects that jurors will set aside their personal biases and re-
strict their deliberations to the parameters set by the trial evidence; then 
they are expected to combine their personal experiences about life in 
weighing the evidence. A competent jury will weigh all aspects of the evi-
dence for completeness and consistency, and consider alternative narratives 
that might be derived from the evidence before it renders its verdict. 
In the following analysis of the evidence we suggest that the “twelve 
angry men” demonstrated reasoning consistent with the story model but 
failed to develop (and thus to consider) very plausible alternative scenarios 
based on the circumstantial evidence. 
II. THE TRIAL EVIDENCE AND THE DELIBERATIONS OF TWELVE ANGRY 
MEN 
A. The Trial Evidence 
As movie viewers we have access only to the issues that were brought 
up in deliberations. Here is a nutshell view of the evidence against the un-
 4. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 3, at 536, 543. 
 5. In some cases additional options such as guilt of a lesser offense, self defense, or insanity are 
involved. 
 6. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 3, at 521. 
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named Hispanic defendant, age 19, who is the defendant, and of the jury 
deliberations. 
Around 8:00 p.m. on the evening of the murder the defendant and his 
father had an argument. The father hit the defendant at least twice. The 
father apparently had hit the defendant many times prior to this night. 
Shortly after this violent encounter the defendant left the apartment. 
The defendant, whose mother had died when he was nine, had a trou-
bled past. He had been in reform school. He had been arrested for a mug-
ging. Twice he had been in knife fights. At approximately midnight a 
woman who lived in an apartment across the elevated train tracks from the 
father’s apartment awoke from her sleep. Through the windows of a noisy 
passing train, she saw a man stabbing the father in the chest. Immediately 
after the attack ended, the lights in the father’s apartment went out. The 
woman called the police and identified the defendant as the assailant. 
An old man who lived in the apartment below the father’s apartment 
testified that at approximately the same time that the woman witnessed the 
stabbing, he heard the defendant yell “I’ll kill you” and a “second” later 
heard a body hit the floor. He got up from his bed, went to the door, and 
saw the defendant running down the stairs. 
The defendant returned to his father’s apartment at approximately 3:00 
a.m. in the morning. The police questioned him in the kitchen. He claimed 
he had gone to see some friends shortly after leaving the apartment follow-
ing the 8:00 p.m. argument with his father. He later testified at trial that he 
went to the movies alone at about 11:00 p.m., returning home at 3:00 a.m. 
to find the police in his father’s apartment. He could not remember the 
titles of the movies or their plots and he could not identify any witnesses 
who saw him at the theatre. 
The defendant admitted that shortly after the 8:00 p.m. fight with his 
father he went to a store and bought an “unusual” switchblade knife that 
appeared identical to the one found embedded in his father’s chest. When 
he later met his friends he showed them the knife. After leaving his friends 
to go to the movies alone, he lost the knife when it fell through a hole in his 
pocket. His friends testified at trial that the knife removed from the father’s 
chest was the one that the defendant had shown them. 
B. The Jury Deliberations 
Led by Juror #8 (Henry Fonda) the jury slowly but systematically 
identified major problems with the prosecution’s evidence. In an evening 
walk during the trial Juror #8 found and bought a knife identical to the one 
used to kill the father. He brought it to the jury room to show that the 
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weapon was not as unique as the prosecution contended. Following a dem-
onstration by one juror, the jurors concluded that because the boy was 
much shorter than his father, it would have not been possible for him to 
stab his father with a downward thrust of the knife as the evidence indi-
cated had happened—and besides, one juror pointed out, a person using a 
switchblade thrusts upward into the victim, not downward. The old man 
who lived below the father was discredited because the jurors concluded 
that the train noise would have prevented him from clearly identifying the 
boy’s voice. In addition they concluded the old man may have fabricated 
seeing the boy run down stairs after the thump of the body hitting the 
floor—or at least may not have obtained a good look at the person running 
down the stairs. They conducted an experiment based on his testimony that 
it took fifteen seconds to get to the door and concluded that he could not 
have traveled the distance in such a short time interval. The female eyewit-
ness was discredited on the assumption that she was not wearing glasses 
and therefore could not accurately identify the assailant given the circum-
stances under which she witnessed the murder. The defendant’s inability to 
remember the movies he saw when he was questioned by the police in the 
kitchen of the apartment was dismissed as the product of the highly 
charged emotional setting. Finally, setting aside their prejudices against the 
defendant and assorted other personal baggage exposed during delibera-
tions, the jury voted to acquit. 
III. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE ACQUITTAL 
Juror #8’s unsanctioned stroll through the defendant’s neighborhood, 
his search to find a similar knife, and, finally, his production of the knife in 
the jury room were highly inappropriate behaviors. Indeed, it is likely the 
judge admonished the jurors to avoid such conduct. If discovered before 
the verdict, the conduct would have resulted in a mistrial. But put this sub-
stantial legal problem aside. 
Is it not a strange coincidence that some other assailant would use a 
knife identical to the one the defendant admitted he bought earlier that eve-
ning following the fight with his father? Although the knife may not have 
been unique as the prosecution contended, it appears to have been an un-
usual knife. Indeed, the evidence suggested it was at least rare. What is the 
probability that the murderer would have gone to the father’s apartment and 
attacked him with a knife identical to the one the defendant bought and 
“lost” that very night? Even more unlikely is a narrative scenario in which 
a stranger found the knife that had fallen out of the defendant’s pocket, by 
chance went to the defendant’s apartment, was admitted, and then stabbed 
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the father. A slightly more probable alternative story is that the defendant 
bought the knife and persuaded one of his friends to stab his father while he 
went to the movies to establish an alibi for himself. However, in that case, 
how likely is it that the defendant would forget the names of the movies 
that he presumably watched? 
What was the likely motive for the homicide? There appears to be no 
evidence of a robbery or some other person having a grudge against the 
victim. In contrast, the defendant clearly had a motive to kill his abusive 
father. And, by his own testimony, immediately after the fight with his 
father earlier that evening, he went to a store and bought a knife identical to 
the one found in his father’s chest. Surely this should be powerful circum-
stantial evidence. Moreover, while the jurors’ analysis of the credibility of 
the motives of the eyewitnesses was thorough, none of the jurors ques-
tioned whether the defendant’s pant pocket in fact had a hole in it through 
which the knife could have fallen. It also would have made a difference 
whether the pockets on the pants worn by the defendant were inside the 
pants or outside the pants. If the former, he likely would have felt the knife 
pass down his leg. 
Now consider the stabbing. The father was stabbed in the upper chest 
from above. The jurors speculated that it was not likely that the defendant 
could have inflicted such a wound because his father was considerably 
taller. The jurors never considered the possibility that the father could have 
been leaning forward to strike the defendant or to ward off the knife thrust. 
Moreover, the juror who pointed out that a switchblade user stabs under-
handed provided no probative evidence. To be sure, most of the time a 
switchblade user uses an underhanded thrust that goes to the gut or makes 
an upward wound into the chest. But in fact whoever stabbed the father 
with the switchblade didn’t do that! The wound was the result of a down-
ward thrust into the chest. The jury never explored this inconsistency, 
which made the demonstration irrelevant.7 No fingerprints were found on 
the knife, but the jurors speculated that the perpetrator must have wiped his 
prints from the knife but left it sticking in the father’s chest. There is an 
alternative explanation for the lack of fingerprints—the defendant planned 
the murder and wore gloves. There are other possible unexplored alterna-
tive scenarios, but the jurors simply rejected this part of the prosecution’s 
story without articulating a credible alternative. 
 7. The jurors also did not take into consideration evidence that the defendant had been convicted 
of being in previous knife fights. Presumably they would have been instructed that the prior convictions 
bore on his credibility, not his guilt. Yet, the jurors never revisited the issue of his credibility using this 
evidence. 
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Next, consider the female eyewitness. From untested circumstantial 
evidence, namely marks on her nose, the jurors speculated that she wore 
glasses. Based on this fragile observation the jurors concocted a story sce-
nario in which she was a desperate, nearsighted woman afraid of being a 
spinster. They never explored the possibility that she may not have worn 
glasses at all; the red marks could have been from nervous rubbing of her 
eyes. Or, if they indeed were from wearing glasses they could have been 
non-prescription sunglasses. Or she may have worn prescription glasses for 
reading only. But even if the jurors were correct in their guess that she was 
nearsighted and needed glasses to see into the father’s apartment, they 
never considered the likelihood that regular wearers of glasses keep their 
glasses handy on a bedside table and automatically put them on before 
looking anywhere—to see what went bump in the room or to see what was 
going on outside the windows, in this case a murder. In any event, how-
ever, this speculation by the jurors about the woman’s vision is like the 
demonstration that a stab with a switchblade likely would be an upward 
thrust; it is contradicted by actual fact. The woman had clear enough vision 
to see the altercation, call the police, report that the father had been 
stabbed, and identify the defendant. 
Similar faulty consideration of the trial evidence involved the chal-
lenges to the old man’s credibility. The jurors engaged in untested specula-
tion about his need to feel important, constructing a scenario that because 
he was old and poor he must have designed his testimony to take advantage 
of this being the first time in his life he was the center of attention. They 
accorded scientific accuracy to his estimate of fifteen seconds, not consid-
ering it may have been only an estimate, and then dismissed other aspects 
of his testimony as likely being inaccurate. His estimate of the time it took 
to get to the door reflected his judgment that it didn’t take too long. It was a 
relative judgment. But the jurors constructed a story scenario accepting part 
of his testimony as valid and not testing the plausibility of the assumptions 
they made from that starting point. 
More could be said, more alternative inculpatory stories developed, 
but our point now should be obvious: the jury deconstructed the evidence 
in a biased way. Led by Juror #8, they systematically dismantled inculpa-
tory evidence without considering the plausibility of the deconstruction. 
Motives of eyewitnesses were manufactured from whole cloth, but the 
plausibility of the defendant’s story was not tested for internal consistency 
or against the circumstantial evidence pointing to guilt. 
Is 12 Angry Men an anomaly, especially in the jurors’ treatment of the 
circumstantial evidence? Consider a real trial. 
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IV. A REAL LIFE TRIAL: THE MORENO MURDERS 
The late Richard Uviller described and analyzed two murder trials re-
sulting in acquittals, arguing that the totality of evidence, especially the 
circumstantial evidence, pointed toward guilt.8 In his terminology “a ver-
dict is ‘false’ when it inaccurately reflects the ‘true’ historical facts of the 
incident.”9 One of the trials he analyzed, the Moreno murders, has a rough 
similarity to the fact situation depicted in 12 Angry Men. Following is an 
abbreviated description of that case. 
Mr. and Mrs. Moreno were Hispanic immigrants in their 60s. A retired 
chef, Mr. Moreno went to meet his wife at a bus stop after midnight to walk 
her home as she was returning from her job as a maintenance worker in an 
office building. As the couple walked from the bus stop, a man with a gun 
confronted them a few doors from their home and shot both dead. 
Two people witnessed the murder: a young actress and a visitor from 
Chicago. They did not know each other or anyone else connected to the 
case, including the victims. They were in different apartments overlooking 
the scene and thus had different viewing perspectives. Both had looked out 
their windows upon hearing gunshots. Each had an unobstructed view of 
the face of the assailant, illuminated by the streetlight as he was standing 
over the victims, and each described the assailant as wearing a white shirt 
and black trousers. There were no other immediate leads to the identity of 
the assailant. 
A few months later the police stopped a car for a traffic violation. The 
driver jumped out of the car with a shotgun, started running, stopped, 
turned, and fired at the police. Miraculously, he failed to hit anyone. After a 
chase the police captured him. His name was Manuelo Rojas. A couple of 
days later, Maria Torres, a frightened woman on parole for a drug offense, 
called her parole officer because she had heard her ex-boyfriend, Manuelo 
Rojas, was out looking for her armed with a shotgun. Maria also told her 
parole officer that Manuelo was involved in “the shooting of the old cou-
ple,” as well as an unrelated killing in front of a bar in the Bronx. Rojas 
was charged with Mr. and Mrs. Moreno’s murders. 
As the case proceeded to trial, new pieces of inculpatory evidence 
were developed. Maria Torres said that Rojas had brought a briefcase con-
taining a pistol to their apartment and put it in the hall closet. She also said 
that on the night the Morenos were killed, Rojas told her that he had to kill 
 8. H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty: Two Case Studies on Jury Misgivings and the 
Misunderstood Standard of Proof, 2 CRIM. L. F. 1 (1990). 
 9. Id. at 3. 
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the old couple because the man had reached for a gun in his belt. In fact, 
the police had found a chef’s knife in Mr. Moreno’s belt and the handle 
could have been mistaken for a gun. A search warrant produced the brief-
case with the gun. The slugs taken from the Morenos’ bodies were too dis-
figured for a ballistics test, but the shell casings recovered at the murder 
scene matched the weapon’s caliber, and scratch marks on the casings were 
consistent with being fired from the gun. Police arranged a lineup with 
Rojas’s lawyer in attendance. The two eyewitnesses independently picked 
Rojas without hesitation. The jury saw pictures of the lineup at trial. 
Shortly before the trial began, Maria Torres spontaneously confessed 
to police that on the night of the killings she had accompanied Rojas and a 
driver the night of the murder. They had dropped off Rojas near the subse-
quent murder scene to attempt a robbery. They picked him up shortly af-
terward. When he entered the car, according to Torres, he told Maria and 
the driver that he had had to shoot the couple. The prosecutor also offered 
an explanation for Rojas being in the Morenos’ neighborhood. Mrs. Mo-
reno’s adult son from a previous marriage testified at trial that he had been 
in the drug trade in Florida and had welshed on a drug deal. Rojas likely 
had been looking for him. 
In short, the evidence against Rojas included two solid eyewitnesses, 
credible evidence that the pistol found in Rojas’s closet probably produced 
scratch marks on the shell casings found at the murder scene, the testimony 
of the former girlfriend, and an explanation for why Rojas might have 
killed the Morenos. To the shock and dismay of the prosecutors, however, 
the jury acquitted Rojas. 
Professor Uviller tried to explain how this came about. When delibera-
tions began, the jury was split with the majority favoring conviction. A 
highly-educated member of the jury who favored acquittal provided leader-
ship for the other jurors who favored acquittal. Early in the deliberations he 
used the lineup photograph to point out that of the six men in the lineup 
only the defendant was wearing a white shirt and dark trousers, similar to 
the clothes that the two eyewitnesses had said the assailant was wearing. 
Moreover, he argued the lineup had taken place some months after the 
shooting. Like Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men, this juror became an ama-
teur defense lawyer, unrestrained by the law or the lack of evidence. He 
argued as fact things that, at best, were speculation. For example, he argued 
that both eyewitnesses had unconsciously identified Rojas in the lineup 
based solely on what he was wearing and not because they recognized his 
face. The false identification in the lineup, he asserted further, might have 
accounted for the witnesses’ identification of Rojas at trial. This, he con-
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cluded, created the real possibility that the prosecution’s entire case rested 
upon a false identification. Based upon that assumption, the confident juror 
deconstructed other pieces of evidence. Unable to match the highly articu-
late leader of the group of jurors arguing for acquittal, the majority of ju-
rors who initially favored conviction eventually subscribed to his logic and 
voted not guilty. 
Uviller argued that the Rojas verdict was likely a false acquittal. In his 
words, 
 The extraordinary thing about Rojas’s acquittal was not the jurors’ 
doubt concerning the accuracy of the independent, detached identifica-
tion testimony of the two eyewitnesses. It was their disregard for the cor-
roborating evidence. Torres’s testimony putting Rojas at the scene of the 
killing and recounting his confession immediately afterward was dis-
missed by the jury as the fury of a woman scorned. In a look of contempt 
that Torres gave Rojas from the stand when she was asked about the 
couple’s breakup, the jury read a level of anger that undermined her tes-
timony entirely. Again, taken by itself, doubt founded on the perceived 
hostility of a witness toward the defendant is altogether reasonable. To-
gether, however, the evidence from the eyewitnesses and Maria Torres 
strengthen each other since it seems unlikely that the person identified by 
the two witnesses would be the very man whom a scorned lover sought 
to convict by perjury. Yet, the way the case evolved, the possible combi-
nation of false inculpatory evidence is hardly too remote for fair consid-
eration. 
 But how about the gun? Is it reasonably likely that the same man er-
roneously identified by the eyewitnesses, falsely inculpated by a venge-
ful former lover, would be in possession of the gun used in the murder? 
In the corridor after the verdict, the prosecutor asked the jurors whether 
they doubted the ballistics expert who linked the weapon to the killing by 
matching scratches on the ejected shells. No problem with the expert, 
they replied, but since Maria had shared the apartment with the defen-
dant, they simply included the gun in her discredited evidence. Perhaps, 
the jurors told the prosecutor, she was the killer herself; perhaps she got 
the gun from the true killer and planted it among the defendant’s belong-
ings.10
Thus, in Uviller’s opinion, the jury ignored a substantial body of cir-
cumstantial evidence that pointed to Rojas’s guilt. 
Professor Uviller also discussed a second trial that had features similar 
to the Moreno murder case. He argued that the two cases demonstrated how 
difficult a jury’s task is.11 Jurors are faced with trying to recreate a histori-
cal incident through the unfamiliar procedures of trial, procedures that are 
formal, not narrative as in ordinary discourse, and under constraints that do 
 10. Id. at 14. 
 11. Id. at 17–23. 
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not allow them to ask questions of the witnesses or to discuss the evidence 
among themselves as it unfolds. Furthermore, both judicial instructions and 
cultural knowledge set a very high standard of belief in factual certainty 
applied only to the prosecution’s case before a guilty verdict is appropriate. 
As the Moreno murder case shows, however, the deconstruction of the 
prosecutor’s case is not bound by a similarly high standard of factual cer-
tainty; articulated speculation alone may do the trick. 
Uviller’s intuitive explanation is consistent with the story model of ju-
ror decision making in that it suggests the failure of the prosecution’s case 
to effectively provide the jurors with a sufficient body of evidence neces-
sary to develop plausible scenarios pointing to guilt. Uviller’s explanation 
did not, however, closely examine the nature of circumstantial evidence 
compared to direct evidence and the role the difference plays in jury delib-
erations. If Uviller was correct in his analysis, why was the apparently 
compelling circumstantial evidence in the Rojas case—and 12 Angry 
Men—undervalued? 
V. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE VERSUS DIRECT EVIDENCE 
Professor Kevin Heller has drawn attention to the substantial body of 
empirical literature suggesting that jurors routinely underestimate the pro-
bative value of circumstantial, as opposed to direct, evidence.12 Circum-
stantial evidence is inherently probabilistic.13 It is evidence from which 
jurors are asked to infer whether disputed facts did or did not exist. For 
example, a series of studies by William Thompson and his collaborators 
found that mock jurors in experiments presenting statistical information 
about probabilities had major problems understanding scientific evidence 
presented in the form of base rates, such as matches between hair sam-
ples.14 Many other studies have shown similar results.15 Faigman and 
Baglioni found that mock jurors generally underutilized statistical informa-
 12. Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
241 (2006). 
 13. To be clear in the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence we offer the follow-
ing discussion from McCormick on Evidence: 
Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue. Circumstantial evi-
dence . . . may be testimonial, but even if the circumstances depicted are accepted as true, ad-
ditional reasoning is required to reach the desired conclusion. 
 . . . [D]irect evidence from a qualified witness offered to help establish a provable fact 
can never be irrelevant. Circumstantial evidence, however, can be offered to help prove a ma-
terial fact, yet be so unrevealing as to be irrelevant to that fact. 
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 641–42 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (footnotes omitted). 
 14. See William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989). 
 15. Much of this research is reviewed in Heller, supra note 12. 
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tion in making decisions about matching samples involving blood group-
ings.16 Wells found that mock jurors, psychology students, and trial judges 
were prone to acquit defendants even when what they subjectively believed 
to be the probability of guilt was sufficient to convict.17
Heller argues that the problem extends beyond forensic evidence such 
as fingerprint matches or DNA to all other evidence that requires an infer-
ence bearing on the defendant’s guilt, such as “the gun used in the crime or 
a shirt stained with the victim’s blood; partial eyewitness identifica-
tion . . . ; testimony about motive; and so on.”18 He argues that while a 
criminal case based primarily on circumstantial evidence is far less likely to 
lead to a false conviction than one based on direct evidence, such cases also 
raise the opposite problem, namely a greater likelihood of a false acquit-
tal.19
Heller points out that the traditional explanation for the lack of weight 
given to circumstantial evidence is that jurors simply do not understand 
it.20 According to this view, DNA analyses, fingerprint comparisons, and 
similar evidence are undervalued simply because jurors cannot properly 
estimate the relevance of probabilities. However, Heller further points out 
that researchers have found that mock jurors are still likely to acquit even 
when they accept that the objective probability of guilt is sufficient to con-
vict.21 He reasonably argues from this research that the tendency to under-
value circumstantial evidence is more of a psychological problem than a 
cognitive one. Drawing on a number of bodies of psychological research, 
he asserts that the problem is centered around the ability to imagine differ-
ent scenarios that are more or less probable.22 Consistent with the story 
model described above, he argues that jurors develop multiple scenarios of 
how a crime may, or may not, have occurred from the trial evidence and 
arguments.23 They must confront at least two irreconcilable accounts: in-
culpatory scenarios based on the prosecution’s evidence and exculpatory 
 16. David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing 
Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13 (1988). 
 17. See Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 
62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992); see also Keith E. Niedermeier et al., Jurors’ Use of 
Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect, 76 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 533 (1999). 
 18. Heller, supra note 12, at 251–52. 
 19. Id. at 252, 299. 
 20. Id. at 255–56. 
 21. Id. at 245 (citing Wells, supra note 17, at 744; Niedermier et al., supra note 17, at 534; Faig-
man & Baglioni, supra note 16, at 16). 
 22. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds, 1982). 
 23. Heller, supra note 12, at 261–64. 
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scenarios based on the defense’s evidence or the defense’s attack on the 
prosecution’s evidence. 
Heller argues that in cases based primarily on circumstantial evidence 
it is easier for jurors to develop exculpatory rather than inculpatory narra-
tives. He identifies four basic differences between direct and circumstantial 
evidence that account for this result.24 It is not necessary here to consider 
these differences in great detail. A summary will suffice for our present 
purposes. Direct evidence is a verbal representation of the crime itself. In 
contrast, circumstantial evidence is an abstraction about the connection 
between the defendant and a physical trace, such as blood or fingerprints. 
The latter does not allow the jurors to imagine as readily how the defendant 
committed the crime, in comparison to the testimony of an eyewitness who 
claims she saw the alleged crime transpire. Direct evidence is narrative in 
nature whereas circumstantial evidence is rhetorical, that is, it requires the 
jurors to infer the specific causes of an historical event from general facts. 
Third, circumstantial evidence permits both inculpatory and exculpatory 
inferences whereas direct evidence suggests a single cause.25 Finally, direct 
evidence is unconditional versus probabilistic. That is, the probability of 
the thing inferred is always less than 1.0, whereas direct evidence implies 
1.0 probability, i.e., certainty.26 In short, circumstantial evidence does not 
lend itself as easily to the development of inculpatory scenarios. If the pri-
mary evidence is circumstantial, juries are less likely to develop inculpa-
tory scenarios in which they are confident beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We have not fully described Heller’s insightful article, but the thrust 
of it is clear: circumstantial evidence is less likely to provide the kind of 
vivid scenarios bearing on guilt or innocence that direct evidence provides. 
Heller’s theory is not incompatible with Uviller’s theory of a heightened 
burden of proof that leads to false acquittals. Indeed the two explanations 
are complementary. Yet, given the right conditions, jurors do convict solely 
upon circumstantial evidence. We explore this matter with another real case 
example. 
 24. Id. at 264–68. 
 25. We do note that in James A. Holstein, Jurors’ Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (1985), a study examining how deliberating jurors developed stories, jurors 
favoring acquittal of a defendant developed multiple scenarios for acquittal, a finding that is possibly 
contrary to Heller’s claim on this point. 
 26. Note that the Holstein findings, id., and perhaps intuitive logic prevent us from assuming that 
direct evidence will be necessarily viewed as certain. After all, cross-examination and the jurors’ com-
monsense knowledge may cause jurors to see the testimony as less than absolutely certain—indeed the 
eyewitness on his own may admit to less than absolute certainty. 
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VI. A CONVICTION BASED SOLELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
On December 9, 2001, at 2:40 a.m. the 911 dispatcher in Durham, 
North Carolina, received a call: “1810 Cedar Street. My wife’s had an ac-
cident. She’s still breathing. She fell down the stairs.” The caller was Mi-
chael Peterson, a successful novelist who had received more than a million 
dollars in advances for his writings, including the novels A Time of War, A 
Time of Peace and The Immortal Dragon. When he and his wife, Kathleen, 
met she was a rising executive at Nortel Networks. They were married in 
1997. The couple had a prominent social life and entertained at big parties 
held in their mansion.27
When police, firefighters, and paramedics arrived at 1810 Cedar Street 
they found Kathleen’s sprawled body at the foot of the stairs. Peterson and 
his wife were at home alone when she died. The local medical examiner 
initially ruled the death accidental, but eleven days later, after a special 
grand jury met to review the case, the district attorney charged fifty-nine-
year-old Michael Peterson with non-capital murder in the death of his 
forty-eight-year-old wife. Peterson protested that he found his wife in a 
pool of blood after she fell down a staircase. The case engendered a great 
deal of national as well as local publicity (e.g., the eventual trial was cov-
ered from gavel to gavel on Court TV). An Academy Award–winning 
French production company covered the trial and produced a critically 
acclaimed documentary shown in Europe and the United States.28
On July 1, 2003, the prosecutor opened the trial with a photograph of 
Kathleen Peterson and a plastic bag from which he took a long brass pipe, 
explaining that it was a blow poke (a fireplace tool consisting of a hollow 
metal tube through which the holder blows air to fan flames; a combination 
poker and bellows). “They say it’s an accident, a fall down the stairs, and 
we say it’s not. We say it’s murder.” In his short twenty-four-minute ad-
dress the prosecutor said that the jury would hear about a storybook mar-
riage but warned them that “appearances can be deceiving.” He told the 
jurors that the blow poke that he held belonged to Kathleen’s sister, but the 
one that Kathleen owned had disappeared and he believed that the missing 
instrument was the likely murder weapon. He said the paramedics who 
arrived at the scene would describe the large amount of blood they found 
and there would be testimony about Michael Peterson’s bloody footprint on 
 27. The Michael Peterson case description is derived from coauthor Vidmar’s notes as the trial 
occurred, live broadcast on local television channel WRAL, articles in the Raleigh News and Observer 
and Durham Herald Sun, and a television documentary of the case, NBC’s Dateline: Mystery on Cedar 
Street, broadcast on February 13, 2004. 
 28. THE STAIRCASE (Sundance 2005). 
VIDMAR AUTHOR APPROVED EDITS(H)(P) 11/16/2007  3:46 PM 
2007] WAS HE GUILTY AS CHARGED? 705 
Kathleen’s sweat pants. He suggested a marriage under financial stress. He 
also said that while the defense likely would argue that the case was about 
forensic evidence, “I couldn’t disagree more. I think it’s about the exercise 
of your reason and common sense.” 
As the prosecutor had forecast, the defense argued that Kathleen died 
from an accidental fall down the stairs which forensic evidence would 
demonstrate, and that despite the prosecution’s suggestion of a marriage 
under stress, the Peterson and Atwater marriage was loving and successful. 
With a photograph of a laughing Kathleen on Michael’s lap projected onto 
a screen behind him, the defense attorney concluded his opening statement 
by reminding the jury that the prosecution had to prove its case for murder 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
The courtroom battle was waged solely around circumstantial evi-
dence. During the fifty-four days of testimony between July and October 
2003, the jurors heard from a parade of prosecution experts that included 
paramedics, police detectives, financial investigators, crime technicians, 
accident reconstructionists, a molecular geneticist, pathologists, neuropa-
thologists, a meteorologist, and a computer expert. The prosecution also 
called a number of civilian witnesses, including Kathleen’s sisters and a 
man with whom Michael Peterson attempted to arrange a homosexual liai-
son. A controversial witness for the prosecution was a German nanny who 
was allowed to testify about the death of a close female friend of Michael 
Peterson in Germany where Peterson was stationed in the military. The 
woman was found dead in a pool of blood at the bottom of stairs in Ger-
many sixteen years before Kathleen died. Michael Peterson was the last 
known person to see her alive and the person who reported finding her 
body, as had been the case with his wife’s death. German officials had 
ruled the death an accident. 
The state’s circumstantial case was comprehensive, but not over-
whelming. A state medical examiner showed autopsy pictures with gashes 
on the back of Kathleen Atwater’s head and opined that these proved that 
Kathleen likely died from blows consistent with a weapon like the blow 
poke the prosecutor had displayed. A neuropathologist testified about red 
neurons found in Atwater’s brain during the autopsy. He explained that 
when a person slowly bleeds to death oxygen diminishes, causing brain 
cells to take on a red or pink hue that are identifiable in brain tissue slides. 
The implication of this testimony was to shift the time of Kathleen’s injury 
back as much as two or three hours before Peterson reported it. If true, 
Peterson’s claim that Kathleen was still alive when he placed the 911 call at 
2:40 a.m. was doubtful. On cross-examination, however, the neuropatholo-
VIDMAR AUTHOR APPROVED EDITS(H)(P) 11/16/2007  3:46 PM 
706 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 82:2 
gist conceded that his finding could be consistent with a range of causes, 
including cardiac arrest and head trauma consistent with an accidental 
blow. Another prosecution expert underwent seven days of cross-
examination. 
The defense also put on a spirited case. The defense demonstrated that 
due to violations of standard investigation protocols by police, technicians, 
and investigators, the death scene and possibly crucial evidence might have 
been contaminated. Policemen and Michael Peterson’s son wandered 
through the house. Michael Peterson’s clothing was not immediately seized 
or photographed, as it should have been. Two bloody towels were never 
seized as evidence and standard chemical tests were never conducted. The 
defense asserted that someone had moved the bloody towels to the stairs, 
which might have produced bloodstains that altered the death scene. A 
technician admitted that although he conducted some crucial tests with 
Luminol, a blood detection chemical, he was not adequately trained to do 
so. The defense established that after police arrived, Michael hovered 
around Kathleen’s body, embracing her and perhaps attempting to place her 
body in a more comfortable position, providing an exculpatory explanation 
of how bloody footprints on her clothes could have been made. In a bold 
move the defense obtained permission to take the jurors to the staircase 
where Atwater was found, in part to prove that there was no room in the 
narrow confine to swing a blow poke in the manner the prosecution 
claimed Peterson had assaulted his wife. 
The defense also called its own experts to counter those of the prose-
cution, including Dr. Henry Lee, the widely respected forensic expert 
famed for his participation in numerous high profile trials, including that of 
O.J. Simpson. An accident reconstruction specialist presented a video re-
construction of how Kathleen could have fallen backwards and struck her 
head. 
Finally, near the end of the trial the defense staged a reverse “Perry 
Mason moment.” They produced a blow poke found in the garage of the 
mansion sometime during the trial that the police apparently had over-
looked in their multiple searches of the house and grounds. The tool was 
covered in insect detritus and was undented. This may have been the miss-
ing blow poke that the prosecution claimed was the murder weapon. The 
clear implication of this evidence was that the prosecution’s central theory 
that Atwater had been beaten with a blow poke was wrong. 
The only living witness who could provide direct evidence of what 
happened that night, Michael Peterson, exercised his constitutional right 
and did not testify. 
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The defense gave its closing arguments first. Pacing in front of the 
jury, the defense lawyer emphasized ten points: (1) The missing blow poke 
wasn’t missing and it wasn’t the murder weapon. (2) The prosecution iden-
tified no credible motive for a killing. (3) The Petersons were happily mar-
ried with no history of violence. (4) Michael’s grief was sincere. (5) 
Kathleen Peterson’s injuries were not consistent with a beating. (6) The 
bloodstain evidence was not consistent with a beating. (7) The evidence 
from the crime scene was tainted and not reliable. (8) The state relied on 
“junk science” to try to prove its case. (9) The state’s case rested on emo-
tion and conjecture, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (10) The state’s 
investigation was based solely on circumstantial evidence and suffered 
from tunnel vision, ignoring evidence that did not support its theory. In 
short, the best explanation for what happened that night at 1810 Cedar 
Street was that Kathleen Peterson tragically fell down the stairs and died 
accidentally. 
In their closing arguments the prosecution weaved the circumstantial 
evidence into a tale of murder, arguing that the defendant had motive and 
opportunity and that the forensic evidence pointed to homicide. The prose-
cution dismissed the defense discovery of a blow poke by saying they had 
never definitively said the murder weapon was a blow poke, only that it 
could have been. 
All legal commentators agreed that the defense’s four-hour closing 
was powerful and persuasive. In particular they commented on the fact that 
both sides and the trial judge agreed that the judge should instruct the jury 
that it had only two choices: first degree murder or not guilty; all lesser 
included offenses were ruled out. Some commentators went so far as to 
predict that there would be an outright acquittal, but certainly no more than 
a deadlocked jury. They were wrong. After fourteen hours of discussion 
over three days, the jury found Michael Peterson guilty of first degree mur-
der. 
Several of the jurors in the Peterson case later provided insight into 
their reasoning. Near the beginning of deliberations, jurors said they had 
dismissed the woman’s death in Germany as irrelevant. The jurors decided 
they had enough to focus on regarding Kathleen Peterson’s death. Like-
wise, they also dismissed Michael Peterson’s sexuality as irrelevant. The 
blow poke was similarly eliminated from consideration; jurors were not 
convinced it was the murder weapon, and they had concerns about it com-
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ing into evidence near the end of the trial.29 One of the three nurses on the 
jury explained:, “We didn’t feel that the blowpoke was necessarily what 
was used in this case, or possibly anything like it.”30
The jurors found the physical evidence from the crime scene the most 
compelling proof. They were especially impressed by the amount of blood 
on the staircase when they visited the home. As one juror said, “I can’t 
imagine a fall that would cause that much blood [on the staircase].”31 
Throughout the deliberations they examined, re-examined, and discussed 
the autopsy photos showing the seven gashes in Kathleen’s head and the 
photos of her body. They eventually concluded that there was no way that 
so many head lacerations and bruises on her arms and legs could have re-
sulted from an accidental fall. 
The jurors integrated their perceptions of the physical evidence with 
expert testimony from the medical examiner and the medical expert who 
described finding red neurons in Kathleen’s brain cells, suggesting that 
Kathleen died slowly from bleeding. This evidence contradicted Michael 
Peterson’s claim that he discovered his injured wife shortly after she fell 
and that she died in his arms after he placed the 911 call. The jurors were 
also critical of some of the prosecution’s testimony. They believed the 
medical examiners “could have done a better job” and were highly critical 
of the state’s forensic experts’ attempts to recreate blood spatter patterns by 
beating on a styrofoam head topped with a bloody sponge. Nonetheless, 
many jurors felt that the state medical examiner’s testimony was the “turn-
ing point of the trial” and rang the truest of all the medical examiners and 
forensic specialists. 
We do not offer an opinion on the verdict. A few commentators be-
lieve the verdict was a false conviction.32 One of the forensic scientists who 
testified for the defense in the trial suggests that perhaps the jury did not 
understand the evidence or (despite their claim otherwise) were influenced 
by the extraneous evidence about the defendant’s sexuality and the similar 
death of Peterson’s female friend in Germany.33 What is clear is that the 
jury found no compelling alternative story that Kathleen Peterson’s death 
 29. For a time line of the jury’s deliberations, see CourtTV.Com, N.C. v. Michael Peterson—
Deliberations, http://www.courttv.com/trials/novelist/jury_box_penalty.html (last visited Aug. 27, 
2007); see also DIANE FANNING, WRITTEN IN BLOOD (2005). 
 30. Matt Bean, Novelist Convicted of First-Degree Murder in Wife’s Staircase Death, 
COURTTV.COM, Oct. 10, 2003. 
 31. Anne Saker, A Complex Drama Ends with a Simple Conclusion, RALEIGH NEWS & 
OBSERVER, Oct. 15, 2003, at A1. 
 32. John Stevenson, Peterson Friends Suggest Owl Did It: Galifianakis, Pollard Say Gashes Are 
Talon Marks, DURHAM HERALD SUN, Dec. 13, 2003, at A1. 
 33. HENRY LEE & JERRY LABRIOLA, DR. HENRY LEE’S FORENSIC FILES 178 (2006). 
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was the result of an accidental fall and in the end their only credible alter-
native story was the circumstantial evidence pointing to murder.  
VII. THOUGHTS ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVOKED BY 12 ANGRY 
MEN 
We are left with some puzzles. We have presented some case studies 
that are selective and possibly not representative of ordinary trials. There 
are no systematic data on conviction rates as a function of the degree to 
which circumstantial evidence plays a role in jury verdicts—for acquittal or 
for guilt. But the case studies provoke thought about possible differences in 
the impact of circumstantial evidence on jurors and about widespread be-
liefs that circumstantial evidence is less persuasive than direct evidence. 
Henry Fonda, playing Juror #8, articulates the view that the defense lawyer 
did not do his job in deconstructing the testimony. We raise another view, 
namely that the prosecutor did not do his job in helping the jury imagine a 
scenario based upon the circumstantial evidence in which the defendant 
was guilty. Perhaps the prosecutor relied too heavily on the direct evidence 
provided by the eyewitnesses, at the expense of articulating the case in a 
way to provide the jurors with a narrative in which the circumstantial evi-
dence was central. Reading Richard Uviller’s analysis of the real-life case 
studies, there is a hint that he also suspected that the prosecutors in his real-
life trials did not do a thorough job of developing the arguments necessary 
to show jurors why the weight of the evidence favored guilt. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Uviller’s Rojas case (and the other 
case that he reported but that we did not discuss in this brief essay) offered 
the jury both direct (eyewitnesses) as well as circumstantial evidence. Is it 
possible in such cases that jurors tend to focus too much on the direct evi-
dence, perhaps because that is what the prosecutors emphasize, causing 
them to undervalue the circumstantial evidence? Does the Peterson case 
suggest that jurors are less inclined to devalue the circumstantial evidence 
when the whole case is about circumstantial evidence? Professor Heller 
recognized the mixed evidence cases and proffered hypotheses for them 
that are similar to what we are suggesting here.34 However, we offer still 
another hypothesis that is somewhat contradictory of the Heller hypothesis 
about circumstantial evidence being less likely to produce a narrative of 
guilt. It is possible that the autopsy photos, expert testimony from the 
medical examiner, the visit to view the blood on the staircase, testimony 
 34. Heller, supra note 12, at 300–02. 
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about the red neurons, and the other circumstantial evidence were in total 
sufficiently vivid to allow the jurors to create a narrative of murder.35
We are left with some intriguing research questions. How often do 
prosecutors proceed with cases based primarily or exclusively upon cir-
cumstantial evidence? Are jurors inherently prone to devalue circumstantial 
evidence as Professor Heller and others before him have suggested, or do 
they devalue such evidence because prosecutors oversell direct evidence? 
To what degree, and when, can circumstantial evidence alone create a suf-
ficiently vivid picture to allow a narrative pointing to guilt? 
In the fifty years since 12 Angry Men was made, it has been embraced 
as a powerful story of how one determined juror prevented an injustice by 
persuading other jurors to acquit. That is an important message for those 
who will serve on juries and, in fact, for all of us: one person can make a 
difference. However, in contrast we offer an iconoclastic perspective. 
Watching the movie again and paying careful attention to the evidence and 
to Juror #8’s deconstruction of the prosecutor’s case leads us to a very dif-
ferent conclusion about the appropriateness of the outcome. The jury very 
arguably acquitted a guilty man because they concocted alternative narra-
tives that were not critically assessed for plausibility, and they ignored 
circumstantial evidence pointing to guilt. 
In this light, 12 Angry Men suggests many other important things 
about juries and their deliberations. It reminds us of the importance of 
small group dynamics in jury decision making and how one person, for 
better or for worse, can influence the verdict. It confirms important work 
about juries and how they construct stories—or fail to construct stories—to 
explain the evidence they have heard. Perhaps most important, it suggests 
the need for more research into the weight that juries accord circumstantial 
evidence. 
 35. Alternatively, the defense argued that the death was an accidental fall. Thus the jury was 
presented with two narratives: murder or an accident. They believed the amount of blood, the number of 
lacerations, and other evidence were inconsistent with an accident. 
